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I am looking for assistance with generating RSA keys in a predictable fashion via a Java code base. I have been doing this for years by seeding SecureRandom before calling KeyGenerator.initialize(bits, secureRandom) but it appears that after BC version 1.51 this began causing different results. In other words, I am unable to generate the same RSA keypair using the same seed between versions 1.51 and anything later.
The reasoning behind this is the avoidance of storing RSA keys on a file system and dynamically generating them as-needed. The merits of this may be in question, but I have been tasked with attempting to continue this behavior while upgrading to BC 1.55. Is there a way for me to get the same results from 1.55 as I do in 1.51? Or is this just an example of a situation where seeding SecureRandom is not guaranteed? If the latter, is there a different way of generating a predictable RSA key pair?
Thanks for your help,
Pasquale
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Can you show how you request the SecureRandom instance and how you seed it? Most implementations do not replace the seeding but append it. They also have a very small window before
they are auto-seeded. For the DRBG you need to als swtich off prediction resistance and re-seeding.
Gruss
Bernd
--
http://www.seeburger.com
From: Pasquale Ranalli [[hidden email]]
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 17:13
To: [hidden email]
Subject: [dev-crypto] PREDICTABLE RSA KEY GENERATION
I am looking for assistance with generating RSA keys in a predictable fashion via a Java code base. I have been doing this for years by seeding SecureRandom before calling KeyGenerator.initialize(bits, secureRandom) but it appears that after BC version
1.51 this began causing different results. In other words, I am unable to generate the same RSA keypair using the same seed between versions 1.51 and anything later.
The reasoning behind this is the avoidance of storing RSA keys on a file system and dynamically generating them as-needed. The merits of this may be in question, but I have been tasked with attempting to continue this behavior while upgrading to BC 1.55.
Is there a way for me to get the same results from 1.55 as I do in 1.51? Or is this just an example of a situation where seeding SecureRandom is not guaranteed? If the latter, is there a different way of generating a predictable RSA key pair?
Thanks for your help,
Pasquale
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The code is below, where "PROVIDER" is new BouncyCastleProvider() and is added via static initialization.
private static KeyPair generateKeyPair(String index) {
try {
int bits = 4096;
byte[] seed = index.getBytes("UTF-8");
KeyPairGenerator keyGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(RSA, PROVIDER);
SecureRandom hash = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN");
hash.setSeed(seed);
keyGen.initialize(bits, hash);
return keyGen.genKeyPair();
}
I appreciate your input,
Can you show how you request the SecureRandom instance and how you seed it? Most implementations do not replace the seeding but append it. They also have a very small window before they are auto-seeded. For the DRBG you need to als swtich off prediction resistance and re-seeding.
Gruss Bernd --
http://www.seeburger.com
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Hi Pasquale,
You could handle this by implementing your own deterministic
SecureRandom, something like the following untested example:
https://gist.github.com/akwizgran/a87a379068f2bbb51e536cb00df96373Cheers,
Michael
On 30/03/17 21:17, Pasquale Ranalli wrote:
> The code is below, where "PROVIDER" is new BouncyCastleProvider() and is
> added via static initialization.
>
> private static KeyPair generateKeyPair(String index) {
> try {
> int bits = 4096;
> byte[] seed = index.getBytes("UTF-8");
> KeyPairGenerator keyGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(RSA, PROVIDER);
> SecureRandom hash = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN");
> hash.setSeed(seed);
> keyGen.initialize(bits, hash);
>
> return keyGen.genKeyPair();
> }
>
> I appreciate your input,
>
> Pasquale Ranalli
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> *From: *"Eckenfels. Bernd" < [hidden email]>
> *To: *"Pasquale Ranalli" < [hidden email]>, "dev-crypto"
> < [hidden email]>
> *Sent: *Thursday, March 30, 2017 3:14:16 PM
> *Subject: *RE: PREDICTABLE RSA KEY GENERATION
>
> Can you show how you request the SecureRandom instance and how you
> seed it? Most implementations do not replace the seeding but append
> it. They also have a very small window before they are auto-seeded.
> For the DRBG you need to als swtich off prediction resistance and
> re-seeding.
>
> Gruss
> Bernd
>
> --
> http://www.seeburger.com>
>
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Michael,
It looks like that will work for me. My early testing verifies that I'm able to generate the same keys across versions now. I'm not able to generate identical keys to what I was previously using, but I can easily re-encrypt my data with the new methodology.
I really appreciate your help, thank you!
Pasquale Ranalli Renaissance Technologies LLC Non-Research Infrastructure 800 Third Ave., 34th Floor New York, NY 10022 212.836.2912 || x2912 [hidden email]
Hi Pasquale,
You could handle this by implementing your own deterministic
SecureRandom, something like the following untested example:
https://gist.github.com/akwizgran/a87a379068f2bbb51e536cb00df96373
Cheers,
Michael
On 30/03/17 21:17, Pasquale Ranalli wrote:> The code is below, where "PROVIDER" is new BouncyCastleProvider() and is > added via static initialization. > > private static KeyPair generateKeyPair(String index) { > try { > int bits = 4096; > byte[] seed = index.getBytes("UTF-8"); > KeyPairGenerator keyGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(RSA, PROVIDER); > SecureRandom hash = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN"); > hash.setSeed(seed); > keyGen.initialize(bits, hash); > > return keyGen.genKeyPair(); > } > > I appreciate your input, > > Pasquale Ranalli > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *From: *"Eckenfels. Bernd" < [hidden email]> > *To: *"Pasquale Ranalli" < [hidden email]>, "dev-crypto" > < [hidden email]> > *Sent: *Thursday, March 30, 2017 3:14:16 PM > *Subject: *RE: PREDICTABLE RSA KEY GENERATION > > Can you show how you request the SecureRandom instance and how you > seed it? Most implementations do not replace the seeding but append > it. They also have a very small window before they are auto-seeded. > For the DRBG you need to als swtich off prediction resistance and > re-seeding. > > Gruss > Bernd > > -- > http://www.seeburger.com > >
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